The Philosophy of Scientific Discovery

Scientific discovery is a complex process that involves many aspects. Typically, it begins with observations of an anomalous phenomenon, followed by attempts to conceptualize the phenomena, and finally by revisions of the existing paradigm to accommodate them. This process is often supported by the use of sophisticated tools and instruments such as centrifuges, X-ray diffraction, and spectrometers.

A number of philosophical treatments have addressed scientific discovery, most notably by philosophers Bacon and Newton, as well as the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treatises on scientific method. While these early discussions rarely treated discovery in a unified way, they all share the same broad concern with the analysis of successful scientific inquiry as a whole.

Some, like Whewell, argued that scientific discovery consists of the binding together of a set of facts and showing them in a new light. Others, including Kuhn, held that this process was a necessary part of scientific discovery but was not itself discoverable. Still others, such as Ducasse, characterized the process of developing a happy thought as a kind of colligation that is neither observable nor capable of being analyzed.

In recent decades, the treatment of discovery in philosophy has shifted to the use of resources from cognitive science, neuroscience, and computational research, among other fields. These approaches have sought to demystify the mental processes that lead scientists to the eureka moment. This approach also acknowledges that there is more to discovery than the moment itself, and that it is the reasoning processes involved in articulating and further developing a happy thought that are analyzable by philosophical means.