Scientific discovery is the process by which novel ideas are articulated and developed. During the 19th century, there were extensive debates about whether and how this process is guided by rules. William Whewell’s two volumes of Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) were a major contribution to this discussion. Many of his arguments were based on the distinction between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification. These discussions eventually gave rise to the disciplinary distinction between science and philosophy of science that continues to shape our thinking about knowledge generation.
Many different responses to this disciplinary distinction have opened up a philosophical perspective on discovery. These responses range from historical studies of actual discoveries to psychological and cognitive research on human reasoning patterns. The common element shared by these perspectives is that they all allow philosophy of science to make some use of empirical information about the structure and cognitive mechanisms of discovery.
One popular response is to argue that discovery is an analyzable reasoning process rather than a mystical leap by which novel ideas appear fully formed. This view has its roots in the pragmatist tradition. It is sometimes characterized by the claim that discovery follows a special logic that differs from inductive and hypothetico-deductive reasoning. One prominent argument in this regard is the one put forward by Norwood Hanson that a discovery’s development proceeds through an act of abductive inference, a form of reasoning that differs from traditional (or syllogistic) logic but that may be sufficiently systematic to deserve the name “logic.” The argument draws on the work of C. S. Peirce and others.